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Why are some uncompetitive industry sectors so effective in lobbying for greater protection 
and support?  This paper attempts to explain the lobbying success of these industries in terms 
of the strategic role of investment in technology as a credible commitment device. By 
eschewing potentially profitable investment opportunities firms credibly signal to the 
government that the cost of a tariff reduction will be substantial.  This enables the firms to 
lobby more effectively for policy concessions   Political considerations may therefore provide 
a significant incentive for firms to reject investment in newer technologies, even when these 
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  A growing body of literature suggests that some older and uncompetitive 
industries often form highly effective lobby groups, which resist reforms such as the 
elimination of trade barriers.
1  Moreover, while successful in lobbying, such industries 
have at times been slow to adopt newer and more efficient technologies.
2  
Theoretically, this finding seems paradoxical.  Rapidly expanding "sunrise" industries 
with more resources at their disposal, ought to be better placed to lobby effectively 
and garner more favourable treatment, than their declining counterparts. 
This paper attempts to address this issue by exploring the interaction between 
a firm’s investment strategy and its lobbying influence on government policy.  It is 
shown that the level of protection received by domestic firms is influenced by their 
prior investment decisions.  By precommitting to (older) relatively high cost 
production techniques, firms can tilt the political game with policy makers in their 
favour.  
The analysis is based on a domestic oligopoly which competes with foreign 
producers.  The domestic firms are protected by a tariff and therefore have an 
incentive to lobby for greater protection.  Lobbying is introduced into this framework 
by drawing on the well established  common agency model of political support 
developed by Grossman and Helpman (1994), which has been widely applied in a 
number of contexts (see, e.g. Fredriksson, 1997, Damania, 2001).  Accordingly, it is 
assumed that a self-interested government cares about both, aggregate welfare and the 
political contributions it receives from lobby groups
3.  Firms seek to influence 
government policy by offering political contributions to the government, in the 
expectation of securing greater tariff protection.  The government in turn, selects the 
policy that maximizes its own welfare.
4    6
It is shown that when lobbying occurs firms have an incentive to underinvest 
in technology.  Specifically, in a political equilibrium, the tariff which is set by the 
government depends on the level of political contributions that it receives, and the 
welfare costs of the chosen policy.  By adopting a less efficient technology, the firm 
credibly signals to the government that a reduction in tariffs will result in substantially 
lower profits.  In the political equilibrium, lobby group contributions are linked to 
profits.  Hence, a decline in profits leads to a fall in political donations.
    A  
government which values political contributions is therefore induced to adopt a policy 
which mitigates the decline in profits and contributions.  In essence, by 
underinvesting in technology, the firms need to spend less on political contributions, 
so that lobbying for protection becomes more productive.  
In deciding on whether to invest in more efficient equipment, the firm will 
trade off the usual cost and benefits of investment, against the need to spend more on 
lobbying, as investment in technology increases.  Consequently, lobbying diminishes 
the net benefits from investment.  The analysis therefore predicts that when 
governments are receptive to lobby group demands, higher levels of protection may 
be associated with relatively lower levels of investment in technology.  That is firms 
adopt the “puppy dog” strategy (Fudenberg and Tirole, 1994). 
  This paper is related to two distinct strands of literature:   political economy 
models of protection in declining industries and the strategic trade policy literature. 
The political economy literature has paid close attention to the role of special interest 
lobbying on trade policy.  However, these studies ignore the effects of a firm’s 
investment decisions on lobbying incentives and policy outcomes.  Long and Vousden 
(1991), Grossman and Helpmann (1996) and Baldwin (1993) are examples in this 
vein.  On the other hand, the strategic trade policy literature focuses upon  7
oligopolistic competition and the strategic investment incentives of firms.  These 
models ignore the influence of special interest group lobbying on policy decisions 
(e.g. Spencer and Brander, 1992, Krugman, 1984, Bouet, 2001).  
This paper combines the political economy approach, with the strategic trade 
policy models.  The analysis is most closely related to Damania (2001) who explores 
environmental policy and lobbying in the context of a simple monopoly
5.  However, 
to our knowledge all the existing literature has thus far assumed that lobby group 
formation and individual firm contributions to a lobby group are predetermined.  This 
paper extends the literature by allowing lobby group contributions to be endogenously 
determined.  Grossman and Helpman (1994) argue that the neglect of collective action 
problems is a significant weakness in the literature, similarly Persson and Tabellini 
(2000, p. 175) note that the common agency approach to lobbying “ lacks an 
explanation of the process whereby some groups get politically organized …”   In 
what follows we investigate whether free riding on political contributions undermines 
efforts to form a lobby group.  The paper derives an important result which shows that 
lobbying remains both feasible and effective, in a non-cooperative equilibrium.  The 
results are therefore robust to the usual collective action problems that make high 
levels of cooperation difficult to sustain. 
It is useful to note that the conclusions of this paper contradict those of the 
strategic trade policy models, when firms compete using quantities. The strategic 
trade literature predicts that investment in technology rises with the level of 
protection.
6  This occurs because higher levels of tariff protection, shift profits from 
the foreign firm to the domestic industry.  Under Cournot competition, the adoption of 
a more efficient technology by one firm, lowers its marginal costs and allows it to 
credibly commit to higher output levels.  There is therefore a strategic incentive for  8
each firm to over-invest in cost reducing technology.  In contrast, the results presented 
in this paper suggest that if firm lobbying plays a significant role in determining 
protection levels, the conclusions of the strategic trade policy models of Cournot 
competition may be reversed.  
  The analysis is based on the following sequence of events.  In the first stage 
the firms simultaneously choose their production equipment, from a continuum of 
available production technologies.  The second stage defines the political equilibrium, 
in which the tariff is determined in a lobbying game.  In the final stage the firms 
choose output levels. 
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows.  Section II outlines the 
basic structure of the model, derives the political equilibrium and describes the 
manner in which investment influences political contributions.  Section III deals with 
the problem of investment and outlines the circumstances under which lobbying 
diminishes the incentive to invest in new technology.  Section IV concludes the paper.  9
II. The Model 
  The aim of this paper is to examine the lobbying incentives of established 
industries which face competition from foreign producers.  Moreover, when protected 
by tariffs or quotas, these industries may be characterized by imperfect competition.  
We therefore assume that a domestic duopoly which is protected by a tariff, faces 
competition from a foreign rival.
7  The duopoly may be sustainable even with free 
trade due to “home bias” and other factors (see Blonigen and Wilson, 1999).  For 
simplicity it is assumed that the industry produces a homogenous product. 
Let X = x
i + x
j be the output of the domestic firms i and  j.   Let y be the output 
of the foreign firm.  Then total industry output is Q = X + y.  The inverse demand 
function is defined as P(Q) = P(X + y);  with P’ < 0, P’’ < 0.  The firms compete 
using quantities as the strategic variable.
8   
The cost to each firm of producing output level q  (q = x
i, x
j, y) is given by the 
cost function C
i(w(τ
i), q), where w(τ
i) is the input price and τ
i defines the type of 
production technology used by each firm.  For given input prices and technology, 
production costs are increasing and convex in output (i.e.∂C
i/∂q > 0, ∂
2C
i/∂q
2 > 0).  
Section III defines the properties of the production technology in more detail.  
However, at this stage we note that the technologies defined as τ
i ∈ [1, T], are 
distinguished by the fact that higher values of τ
i correspond to technology with lower 
production  costs (i.e. ∂w/∂τ
i < 0).  Hence, the technologies with larger values of τ
i 
may be regarded as more cost effective and efficient.  These assumptions imply that 
total and marginal production costs decline with more efficient technologies. We 
further assume that C
i(w(τ
i), q) satisfies all the usual properties of a cost function.
9    10
  The analysis is based on the following sequence of events.  In stage 1 the firms 
simultaneously determine investment levels in equipment (i.e. choice of τ).  The next 
stage defines the political equilibrium where each firm determines its political 
contributions (S
i) independently, while the government sets the tariff (t) to maximize 
its payoffs.  In the final stage, the firms compete using quantities as the strategic 
variable.  As usual, the model is solved by backward induction. 
In an attempt to influence the level of protection, each domestic firm offers 
political contributions S
i to the government.  Thus, domestic firm i's profits are 
defined as:  
() (())
ii i i i P Qx Cw x S τ Π= − −  ( i = 1,2; i≠j) (1a) 
In keeping with the existing literature we assume that the foreign firm, being located 
overseas, has no leverage on domestic policy issues and therefore does not engage in 
lobbying (see, e.g. Grossman and Helpman, 1995).  The foreign firm’s profits are 
given by: 
   () (( ) ,)
yy P Qy Cw y t y τ Π= − −     (1b) 
where t is the tariff. 
 
Stage 3 Output Competition  
We begin by solving the final stage of the game in which output levels are 
determined.  Taking investment levels, the tariff and contributions as given, 
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n denote the symmetric equilibrium solution of the domestic firms.
 10 
  For future reference, the following well known comparative static properties 
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Equation (2a) reveals that with greater protection (higher tariffs) the domestic firms 
expand their output levels, while the foreign firm’s output contracts.  This occurs 
because a higher tariff shifts demand from the foreign to the domestic industry and 
results in an increase in domestic output levels.  However, overall, domestic 










>>       ( i,j = 1,2; i≠j)   (2b) 
Equation (2b) suggests that adoption of a more efficient technology by a firm, lowers 
its production costs and thus induces an expansion in its own output level. 
 





<<<    ( i,j = 1,2; i≠j)   (2c) 
Finally, equation (2c) summarises the well known result that investment in an 
oligopoly has strategic effects.
11  Ceteris paribus, the adoption of a more efficient 
technology by one firm, lowers its marginal costs, and allows the firm to credibly 
commit to more aggressive (i.e. higher) output responses.  Since quantities are 
strategic substitutes, the commitment to a higher output by one firm induces its rival 
to lower its production levels in response.   
  
Stage 2: The Political Equilibrium  12
Having defined equilibrium output levels, we now consider the manner in 
which political contributions are determined. For given technology (τ), each domestic 
firm will choose its political contributions (S
i) to maximise profits, taking account of 
the impact of its choices on output market competition in stage 3.  Each firm solves: 
   () (())
i
ii i i i
S
P Qx Cw x S Max τ Π= − −      (i = 1,2; i≠j) (3a) 
where x
i  is defined as the solution to (1c) and (1d). 
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=+ >
∂∂ ∂ ∂
, then (3b) defines an interior solution only 





.  This implies that lobbying will occur only if higher political 
contributions (S
i) induces the government to set a higher tariff (t). 
  Following Grossman and Helpman (1994), the government is assumed to 
maximize a weighted sum of the political contributions it receives and aggregate 




C WP Q d Q P Q Q t y ≡− +       ( 4 a )  
Aggregate social welfare gross-of-contributions is given by the sum of expression 
(4a) and gross-of-contributions profits (denoted Π  ) 
 , ≡+ Π  C WW  (4b) 
where: ; ;  ( 1,2, ) Π=Π +Π Π =Π + = ≠   ij ii i Si ij . 
The government’s objective function is given by a weighted sum of political 
contributions and social welfare  (Grossman and Helpman, 1994):  13
   G = S  + αW       ( 4 c )  
where:  α is the weight given to aggregate social welfare relative to political 
contributions  S= S
i + S
j.   
This specification of government utility is widely used in the political support 
literature.  It is based on the assumption that political donations are valued by 
governments because of their many uses, such as funding election campaigns, retiring 
debt from previous elections and deterring rivals.  On the other hand social welfare is 
included to capture the notion that the prospect of retaining power may be linked to 
average welfare in the economy (Grossman and Helpman, 1994).  By this 
interpretation, the weight (α) given to social welfare is determined by factors such as 
the level of political competition, political stability, and the policies of rivals.  There 
are several alternative models of self interested government behavior.  The most 
significant of these are models of political competition (see, Persson and Tabellini, 
2001 for a survey).  However, the formulation of government utility used in (4c) 
subsumes many of the important features of lobbying and political competition that 
are captured in the alternative models of government behaviour and is therefore used 
in this paper (Persson and Tabellini, 2001, Grossman and Helpman, 1994).   
For future reference let the welfare maximizing level of domestic output be 
defined as: 
  t*  =  Argmax  W      (4d) 
where 
'( ( / ) (( / ) ( / ))
*
/
i P Xx t yX t yt y
t
yt
∂∂ +∂∂ + ∂ ∂ −
=
∂∂
≥ 0 is the tariff required to 
achieve the welfare maximizing output level Q* >0.  Define W* as the resulting 
(maximal) level of welfare at Q*.
13  The second order condition for a maximum 
requires that  ∂
2W/∂t
2 < 0, which is assumed to hold.  14
  A subgame perfect Nash equilibrium for this game is a contribution (S
i) for 
each firm and a tariff (t
L), such that: (i) the contribution is feasible and maximises 
each firm's payoffs, taking the other firm's contributions as given; (ii) the policy t
L 
maximizes the government’s welfare, G, taking the contributions as given.   
  From Lemma 2 of Bernheim and Whinston (1986) the following necessary 
conditions yield a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium {S,t
L}: 
   t
L ∈ Argmax G = S + αW;   (SI) 
   t
L ∈ Argmax  G ) t ( + Π    (SII) 
Condition (SI) asserts that the equilibrium tariff t
L must maximize the government’s 
payoff, given the contribution offered by the industry lobby group.  Condition (SII) 
requires that t
L must also maximize the joint payoff of the firms and the government.  
If this condition is not satisfied, the lobby group will have an incentive to alter its 
strategy to induce the government to change the tariff, and capture more of the 
surplus.  Maximizing (SI) and (SII), and performing the appropriate substitutions, 
yields the political equilibrium contribution of the lobby group which satisfies: 







.      ( 5 a )  
S
L = contributions at equilibrium tariff t
L, Π
L = profits at equilibrium tariff t
L. 











Thus, as noted by Grossman and Helpman (1994), the political contribution schedule 
is  locally truthful.  As in Bernheim and Whinston (1986), this concept can be 
extended to a contribution schedule that is globally truthful.  This yields a function 
which accurately mirrors the preferences of the lobbyist's at all policy points.  The 
Appendix provides a discussion of the existence of this equilibrium.  15
Having determined the slope of the contribution schedule, it is necessary to 
derive an expression for the level of contributions in a political equilibrium.   
Grossman and Helpman demonstrate that with one lobby group, the equilibrium 
contribution to the government is defined by the difference in social welfare, when the 




L = α(W* - W
L)       ( 5 b )  
Where: W* is the level of social welfare which eventuates when the tariff is set at the 
welfare maximising level t* and W
L is the level of social welfare when the tariff is set 
at the political equilibrium level t
L. 
Observe that α(W* - W
L) defines the loss of utility to the government when the 
tariff deviates from the welfare maximising level.  Equation (5b) reveals that political 
contributions perfectly compensate the government for the welfare loss associated 
with participation of the lobby group in the political process.  The welfare loss is 
weighted by the factor α in order to adjust for its importance in the government’s 
objective function. 
Clearly, the equilibrium defined in equation (5b) can be sustained only if the 
individually rational contributions of firms as given in (3b) are sufficient to 
compensate the government for its utility loss from raising the tariff (i.e. 5b). If this 
condition does not hold the government has no incentive to raise the tariff above the 
welfare maximising level so that there can be no effective lobbying. Lemma 1 
explores this issue in greater detail and outlines an important property of the 
equilibrium that has been overlooked in the literature.  
  16
Lemma 1 The individually rational contributions of the firms (as defined in (3b)), 
equals the amount that is necessary to induce the government to raise the tariff above 
the welfare maximizing level (as defined in (5b)).  
 
Proof: From equation (3b) the profit maximising political contributions offered by 
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.  The tax schedule t(S) is thus monotonic and hence its inverse exists.
14  











     (i=1,2; i≠j)    (II) 
Observe that (II) is the local truthfulness condition, necessary for a subgame perfect 
Nash equilibrium in equation (5a).   
Since both domestic firms are symmetric, then aggregating equation (II): 
     22 .
ii SS
tt t t
∂Π ∂Π ∂ ∂
≡= ≡
∂∂ ∂ ∂
    (III) 












      ( I V )  
Substitute (IV) in (III), and integrate: 
**
2( * ) ( * ) .
∂Π ∂






Sd td t W W W W
tt
αα α       (V) 
where W
L = welfare at political equilibrium tariff t
L and W* = welfare at the welfare 
maximimising equilibrium tariff t*.  
Expression (V) defines the equilibrium level of lobby group contribution payments.  It 
is equal to the equilibrium contribution amount defined in (5b), which is necessary to  17
compensate the government for raising the tariff above the welfare maximizing level.  
Q.E.D 
 
Lemma 1 reveals that the individually rational (Nash) contributions which 
maximise a firm's profits (i.e. (3b)), are equal to the contributions necessary to support 
a subgame perfect equilibrium of the political game with higher tariff levels (i.e. 
(5b)).  Observe that, since the benefits from paying political contributions accrue to 
the entire (domestic) industry rather than the individual firm, the problem is 
analogous to that of the private provision of a public good.  Hence each firm has an 
incentive to “undersupply” lobbying contributions, relative to the amount that would 
be paid in a fully cooperative equilibrium with no free-riding.  Lemma 1 shows that 
the lobbying equilibrium in this model does not require contributions (i.e. 
cooperation) between lobbyists beyond that which obtains from independent firm 
optimisation.  Hence, the individually rational Nash contributions of each firm are 
sufficient to compensate the government for its utility loss from raising the tariff 
above the welfare maximising level.  Accordingly, lobbying is not undermined by 
collective action problems that require levels of cooperation beyond the individually 
rational level. 
15   
Recall that technology levels are chosen in Stage 1 and are therefore taken as 
given (in Stage 2) when political contributions are determined.  However, in choosing 
its technology levels each firm will take account of the impact of its investment 
decisions on political contributions.  It is therefore instructive to examine the 
consequences of varying technology levels (in Stage 1) on the political equilibrium in 
(Stage 2).   
  18
Lemma 2:  The adoption of more efficient technology τ
i in Stage 1, increases 






=+>  (i= 1,2 i ≠j)). 
Proof: See Appendix  
Intuitively, this result follows from the local truthfulness property (equation 
(5a)), which states that political contributions mirror the marginal profitability of any 
policy change.  Ceteris paribus, the adoption of a more efficient technology by firm i, 
lowers its production costs and thus raises profits.  Since a given tariff level now 
yields higher profits, by local truthfulness, political contributions rise.
16  Hence 
investment in technology makes lobbying for protection more expensive for the firms. 
 
Lemma 3:  The adoption of more efficient technology by domestic firms in 
Stage 1 leads to a lower tariff being set in the political equilibrium, if the demand 






 < 0 if R > - 1/Qt,  where R = P”Q/P’  (i,j = 1,2; i ≠ j)). 
 
Proof:  See Appendix. 
Intuitively, this result may be explained as follows.  From equation (5a) we 
know that political donations are truthful, in the sense that they reflect variations in 
payoffs which result from a change in the tariff.  Suppose that a firm chooses not to 
invest in a more efficient technology.  Ceteris paribus, production costs will be 
relatively higher, so that a given level of protection yields lower profits.  By Lemma 
2, political contributions will decline.  A government that values political 
contributions, has an incentive to adopt policies which raise profits and political  19
donations.  To maintain contribution levels, the government therefore raises (or does 
not lower) the tariff level.  The requirement that demand not be too convex is a 
regularity condition that is widely used in much of the strategic trade literature (see, 
Brander and Spencer (1992)).  It ensures that higher tariffs improve domestic payoffs.  
This requirement is always satisfied for a linear demand curve.  Lemma 3 therefore 
reveals that when this condition holds, then in a lobbying equilibrium the adoption of 
a more efficient technology will lead to lower levels of protection.  In keeping with 
much of the literature, it is assumed that this convexity requirement holds. 
This finding has important implications for firms’ investment strategy.  If 
firms can credibly commit to higher production costs in earlier stages of the game, 
they can lower the political contributions that will be paid in the ensuing political 
equilibrium.  The next Section deals with the circumstances in which technology can 
be used as a credible commitment device. 
 
IV Technology Choice 
This Section investigates the manner in which political lobbying influences the 
firm's choice of production technology.  We begin by defining the properties of the 
available technologies.  
Let τ
i ∈ [1, T] ⊂ ℜ+ 
  (i = 1,2; i ≠j) be the continuum of existing production 
technologies.  The technologies in τ
i are distinguished by their associated production 
costs.  Specifically, there exists a one-to-one mapping from the set of technologies (τ
i) 
to the costs associated with each technology (w(τ












.Thus, higher values of τ
i correspond to equipment which 
embodies lower production costs.  The cost of purchasing equipment associated with  20
a given technology of type τ
i ∈ [1, T] is given by K(τ
i).  It is assumed that K(τ
i) is a 


















 >0.  This implies that the efficient 
technologies, with correspondingly lower production costs, are more expensive to 
purchase. 
In Stage 1 each firm will choose a type of technology (τ
i) to maximise profits, 
taking account of is technology choice on all the other decision variables (i.e. output, 
political contributions and the tariff).  Thus: 
  ˆ     ( ) ( ( , ) ( )
i
in i n i i PQx Cw x S K Max
τ
ττ Π= − − −       (6a) 
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ττ τ τ τ
∂∂ ∂ ∂ ∂
=+ −−
∂∂ ∂ ∂ ∂
    (6b) 
 
Equation (6b) reveals that the type of equipment (τ
i) adopted depends on a 
variety of factors, which encompass political, strategic and cost considerations.  Each 
of these is discussed briefly below.  The firm acquires the type of equipment at which 








), is set equal 
to the net marginal benefits of the improved technology.  These include the marginal 





).  In addition, 
from Lemma 2 we know that adoption of a more efficient technology raises political 
contributions by the local truthfulness property.  Thus, the need to lobby more 
intensively partly diminishes the benefits of acquiring a more cost effective 
technology and lowers the level of investment in technology.  These effects are  21





.  Finally, as noted earlier, investment in cost saving 
technologies has strategic output effects (equation (2c)).  Adopting a more efficient 
technology allows a firm to credibly commit to more aggressive (i.e. higher) output 
responses.  Since quantities are strategic substitutes, the commitment to a higher 
output induces a rival to lower its production levels, thereby raising the expected 
profits of the firm that invests.  Oligopolistic output competition therefore induces 
firms to increase investment levels.  The strategic output effects are summarised by 










Observe that in the absence of lobbying, firms would simply equate the 
marginal cost of acquiring a more efficient technology to the marginal benefits in the 
form of cost savings and strategic effects from the equipment.  It is therefore 
important to investigate whether lobbying results in (higher) lower investment in 
technology.  This issue is dealt with in the following Proposition.   
Define the choice of technology
  under lobbying as: 
ˆ max ( ) ( ( ), ) ( )
ii n i n i i
LL L L L L L L Arg P Q x C w x S K ττ τ ∈Π =− − −  




L = tariff in the lobbying equilibrium, x
n
Lis the corresponding 
output of firm i = 1,2, subscript L on variables denoted terms in the lobbying 
equilibrium. 
Define the choice of technology in the absence of lobbying as: 
max ( ) ( ( ), ) ( )
ii n i i n i
uu u u u u u u Arg P Q x C w x K τ∈ Π= − τ − τ  
Where:   *) t , ( Q Q
i
u u τ =  is industry output when the tariff is at the welfare maximising 
level t* and there is no lobbying and x
n
u  is the corresponding firm output level, 
subscript u on variables denotes terms in the absence of lobbying.  22
 
PROPOSITION 1: If the production costs associated with less efficient technologies 
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>0).  From (I) and (II) this implies that the right hand side of (II) must be 
less than that of (I):- 
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        QED 
  Proposition 1 formalises the condition that underinvestment in technology acts 
as a credible commitment device, only if less efficient technologies are associated 
with sufficiently high production costs.  Intuitively, when the cost increase from 
rejecting a more efficient technology is sufficiently large, underinvestment provides a 
credible signal to the government that a reduction in tariffs will result in substantially 
lower profits.  Since political contributions are linked to profits, a decline in profits  23
leads to a fall in political donations.
   A government that values political contributions 
is therefore induced to adopt a more favourable policy towards firms.  Thus there will 
be higher levels of tariff protection associated with lower levels technological 
investment.  
  Stated differently, when the cost saving from adopting a more efficient 
technology is sufficiently high, underinvestment in the first stage of the game 
provides a credible signal to the government that lower tariffs will result in lower 
political contributions.  Underinvestment therefore tilts the political game in the 
domestic industry’s favour.
18  Finally, we note that the underinvestment equilibrium is 
based on Nash conjectures by each firm and therefore does not involve any 
cooperation beyond the individually rational levels. 
 
IV Conclusions and Implications 
  This paper has examined the interaction between investment, lobbying and 
protectionist policy decisions.  The central message is that when governments are 
receptive to special interest group pressures, political considerations may provide an 
incentive for firms to reject cost saving investments.  If the costs associated with less 
efficient technologies are sufficiently high, underinvestment in technology provides a 
credible signal to the government that profits and political donations will decline if 
tariffs are lowered.  A government that values political contributions is therefore 
induced to adopt a more favourable policy towards firms.  Hence, industries with 
more costly technologies are better placed to secure policy concessions.  
The main findings of this paper conflict with the conclusions of the strategic 
trade policy models which predict that, under Cournot competition, protection induces 
greater investment in cost saving technology.  Hence, the validity of the results  24
presented here must rest on the empirical evidence.  However, the mechanisms 
identified in this paper are new, hence econometric support for the conclusions is hard 
to find.  However, there is some indirect empirical evidence which is consistent with 
the predictions of the model. 
A number of studies have attempted to test the infant industry argument.  At 
its simplest level the infant industry hypothesis asserts that newly formed industries 
may require time to establish and become competitive.  There is therefore a need for 
temporary protection to allow the industry to mature, so that costs can fall to the level 
of international competitors.  A number of empirical studies have tested this 
hypothesis.  It has been found that infant industries continue to be protected many 
decades beyond the anticipated period of protection.  More importantly, increased 
protection has been associated with higher production costs (Kruger and Tuncer 
(1982), Baldwin (1988), Baldwin (1992), Lucas (1984)).  These findings appear to be 
consistent with a key prediction of the model:  underinvestment in cost saving 
initiatives can be credibly used to sustain high levels of protection.   
There is further support for the results from a number of industry based 
studies.  In an econometric study of lobbying in the agricultural sector, Eliste and 
Fredriksson (1999) find that users of older and more damaging technology obtain 
greater net policy support from the government.  Similarly, studies of the metal 
industry in Korea (Truett and Truett, 1997), electronics in Brazil (Luzio and 
Greenstein, 1995), engineering in Indonesia (Braadbart, 1996), vehicle manufacture in 
South and S.E. Asia (Okamato, 2000) note that these industries are heavily protected.  
However, they have higher production costs than their international rivals and 
produce goods that lag behind the technological frontier.  These conclusions once 
again appear to be consistent with the central conclusion of this paper.  It is perhaps  25
useful to note that the results of this paper simply indicate that less efficient industries 
may be more successful in securing concessions.  The analysis does not suggest that 
tariffs will never decline.
19 
  There are a number of other issues that have not been considered so far.  Most 
important of these is the assumed form of competition in the output market.  It is well 
known that results based on strategic interactions are highly sensitive to the assumed 
form of competition in oligopolistic markets.  It is therefore important to determine 
whether the main result summarised in Proposition 1 is reversed under the assumption 
that firms compete in prices in the final stage of the game.  Consider the problem 
when the duopolists compete in prices.
20  Recall from Proposition 1 and Lemma 2, 
that underinvestment raises costs and lowers political contributions.  The credible 
threat of lower contributions induces the government to provide greater protection.  
This link between lobbying and investment is unaffected by price competition, so 
long as underinvestment raises production costs sufficiently.  This is because the 
underinvestment equilibrium arises as a consequence of the interaction between the 
government and each firm, rather than as a result of the strategic interaction between 
firms.  While the qualitative effects are unaffected by the form of product market 
competition, the quantitative impacts may differ.  However, we are unable to say 
anything about the relative sizes at this level of generality.  
Another important issue is the assumed sequence of events.  The credible 
commitment effects stem from the assumption that firms determine their investment 
first and the government chooses its policy taking the investment decision as given.  
This seems reasonable if it is supposed that investment in technology is a long run 
decision variable, while the details of government policies are influenced by lobby 
group pressures and more immediate (short term) political concerns.
21  If, however,  26
firms delay their investment decisions so that the sequence of events is reversed, then 
investment can no longer have a credible commitment effect.  Clearly, delaying 
investments would be the rational strategy for firms if they expect a regime change 
that brings in a government which places no weight on political contributions from 
the industry lobby group.  
Finally, it worth noting that the results in this paper are consistent with those 
of Wright (1995), who explores the time consistency of future tariff policies.  Wright 
demonstrates that a policy of tariff removal can be rendered time inconsistent if a firm 
increases its costs.  However, Wright does not does not explicitly model lobbying or 
the political process, and abstracts from investment and credibility issues.  Thus, even 
though the objective and framework of Wright's analysis differs from this paper, the 
results lend further support to the basic conclusions of this model.  
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APPENDIX   
PROOFS OF EQUATIONS (2a) - (2c): 
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By condition (SI) in the text, the tariff is determined by the government to maximise 
its welfare.  The tariff thus satisfies the first order condition: 
'( ) ( 1 ) ( ' )0
i
tt t t t GP X xy y t yP Q Q αα =+ + + + −=  (A12) 
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By the SOC it is assumed that Gtt < 0.  Thus sign of dt/dτ
i = sign of  i t G
τ . 
Further differentiating (A12): 
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Rearranging (A14) it can be verified that  i t G
τ   < 0 if RQt > - 1 where R = P”Q/P’ 
which is the usual measure of convexity of the demand function that is used in the 
literature (see, e.g. Brander and Spencer (1983)).  
Thus, if R > - 1/Qt
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EXISTENCE OF A POLITICAL EQUILIBRIUM 
Shapiro (1986) discusses the necessary conditions for a Cournot equilibrium in the 
output market to exist in a game such as that outlined in Section II.  It is shown that if 
the first and second order conditions are satisfied a Cournot equilibrium will exist and 
be stable.   
Showing existence of the political equilibrium is, however, somewhat more 
complicated and hence a brief discussion of this issue is provided here.  To establish 
the existence of the political equilibrium it is necessary to show that the game played 
between the firms and the government satisfy Kakutani’s fixed point theorem.  To do 
so we introduce some further notation. 
Let S
i ∈σ
i  be the strategy space of firm i (i = 1,2 i ≠ j) 
where S
i denotes contributions of firm i. 
Let  t ∈σ
G  be the strategy space of the government 
where t is the tariff. 
Define σ = σ
i x σ
j x σ
G,  as the Cartesian product.  It defines the strategy space of the 
game played between the firms and the government. 
Define Π 
i(σ, Q) as firm i’s payoffs and G(σ, Q) as the government’s payoffs 
Assumption 1:  σ
i is compact.  Note that it is closed since 0 ≤ S
i ≤ Π 
i(σ, Q)  29
Assumption 2  σ
G is compact.  It is closed since t* ≤ t ≤  ˆ t ,  where t* is the welfare 
maximising tariff and  ˆ t  is defined by the condition that Π 
y(ˆ t ) = 0 (that is, the height 
of the tariff is such that the foreign firm earns no profits in the domestic market). 
Assumption 3 Π 
i(σ, Q) is jointly concave with respect to S
i and Q and G(σ, Q)is 
jointly concave with respect to t and Q. 
 
Result: By theorem 2.4 of Friedman (1980) the game between the government and the 
firms satisfies the conditions of Kakutani’s fixed point theorem and has one fixed 
point.  An equilibrium point therefore exists. 
 
This result may be established by showing that the following conditions hold: 
Condition 1. the domain of the best reply functions are compact and convex 
Condition 2. the  image sets of the best reply functions are contained in σ 
Condition 3. the image sets of the best reply functions are convex  
Condition 4. the best reply functions are upper semicontinuous. 
 
Note that Condition 1 is satisfied by Assumptions 1 and 2 and the fact that the 
Cartesian product of convex sets is convex.   
To see Condition 2 define the best reply mapping of (say) the firms as: 
*' ' ( ) { * ( \ ) ( \ ) for all  }
ii i i i i ii
i rS S S S σσ σ σ σ =∈ Π ≥ Π ∈  
That is the strategy S
*i is a best reply to other strategy combinations if it maximises 
the payoffs of i given the strategies of other players.  Such an  S
*i  exists because it is a  
maximiser of a continuous concave function over a compact set and by construction it 
is required to be in σ. 
To establish Condition 3 suppose that 
 S
1, S
2 ∈ ri(σ).  Define 0 < λ < 1 and S
λ = λS
1 + (1-λ)S
2 . Concavity of Π





1) +(1 - λ)Π
i(S




ri(σ),  hence this yields a contradiction
22. It follows that equality holds and S
λ ∈ ri(σ).  
So ri(σ) is convex. 
Finally, Condition 4 follows directly from Lemma 2.5 of Friedman (1980) which 
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1 ElAgraa (1987) provides evidence based on inter industry studies. Some industry specific cases 
include: textiles in the USA (Dixit and Londregan (1995)), agriculture in developed countries 
(Anderson (1995)).  Baldwin (1993) and Grossman and Helpman (1996) provide a general discussion 
of this issue. 
2 Discussion of the evidence is provided in Section IV.  
3 Political donations influence the government’s decisions because of their many uses, including 
funding election campaigns, retiring debt from previous elections and deterring rivals. 
4 Since the focus of this paper is upon the effects of lobbying by producers, the role of an opposing 
consumer lobby group is suppressed. This may be justified by assuming that the benefits of a tariff are 
concentrated, but the costs of protection are so thinly spread that they do not provide sufficient 
incentive for individuals to organize a lobby group, or make political donations.   
5  Damania (2001) ignores complications that arise from the strategic interactions between firms and 
the analysis is thus analogous to that of the political economy literature. 
6  There is usually a restriction for this result to occur (which is often implicit in the second order 
conditions).  It is the requirement that demand not be too convex.  This condition ensures  that the rent 
shifting benefits from the foreign to the domestic industry are sufficiently large. 
7 The results can readily be generalized to the case of an n > 2 firm oligopoly at both home and 
overseas. 
8  The central conclusions are not affected by the assumption of Cournot competition.  This issue is 
addressed in Section IV. 
9 That is, the cost function C
i(w(τ
i), q) is homogenous of degree one in input price, convex in  output 
and concave in input price. 
10  The arguments of functions are ignored for notational brevity when not essential. 
11  See, for example, Tirole (1990), p 323. 
12  The second order conditions are specified in the Appendix. 
13  We implicitly rule out an import subsidy and assume that some level of domestic production is 
optimal and can be achieved with a non-negative tariff.  This assumption is made to simplify the 
proofs, but is not essential to the central results. 
14  This assumption is implicit in the Grossman Helpman model which assumes that ∂S/∂t > 0 for all 
feasible t >t*. 
15   Note that the noncooperative profit maximising (Nash) contributions of each firm are non-zero 
when there is an interior solution to (3a).  A corner solution with zero contributions occurs when the 
costs of lobbying always exceed the benefits of lobbying.  In this case both the fully cooperative and 
the non-cooperative equilibrium contributions are zero.  Another property that is worth stating is that 
the political equilibrium is identical whether the lobbyists are assumed to be "groups" representing an 
entire industry or simply the firms acting individually. Intuitively, this follows directly from the local 
truthfulness condition (5a).  Formal proofs are available from the author upon request.   
 
16   Since lower costs give firm i a greater share of the market, firm j’s profits and (by local 
truthfulness) political contributions decline.  However, the increase in i’s contributions outweighs the 
decline in j’s contributions, so that aggregate industry political contributions rise. Formally, this 
reflects the fact that the slope of the reaction functions are less than unity in absolute value.  Hence the 
decline in j’s contributions do not offset the increase in i’s contributions.  32
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.  Using these results, yields the first order condition in (6b). The first 














18  This is an example of Fudenberg and Tirole’s (1984) “puppy dog” strategy. 
19  For instance a referee provided a counter-example of trade policies in the Thatcher era, where trade 
barriers in the older industries were systematically lowered.  Our model does not suggest that such 
policy initiatives are impossible to introduce, but that in the high cost industries lobbying would be 
more effective and hence reforms are harder to introduce if the government values political donations 
from these industries.   
20 To avoid the discontinuity problems caused by Bertrand competition let the goods produced by the 
duopolists be imperfect substitutes, sold at prices P
i and P
j (i = 1,2 i ≠j). 
21   This is one of the central assumptions of the Grossman-Helpman model.  It defines the short run 
political equilibrium, taking longer term considerations as given.    
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